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The Constitutional Problems with Late
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense
Counsel: A Proposed Solution
Introduction
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors
may bring motions to disqualify defense counsel up until the date set for
trial.' In recent years, the number of motions brought to disqualify op-
posing counsel for alleged conflicts of interest has vastly increased.2 De-
spite attempts to curb the increase,3 "[m]ost avid advance sheet readers
would conclude that the flow of disqualification motions has not ebbed." 4
While there are times when it is proper for an attorney to seek to disqual-
ify her opponent,5 disqualification motions have become tactical weapons
in the adversary process:6 they are commonly brought simply to harass
the opponent, to cause extra expense, to force an unwanted and unneces-
sary change of counsel, and to postpone the trial date.7 Indeed, many
courts have concluded that an increasing number of disqualification mo-
tions are interposed for purely strategic purposes.' Late motions may
deny the defendant's constitutional rights to effective assistance of coun-
sel and a speedy trial, however, and to the extent it is recognized, late
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL CODE] requires only that a lawyer shall not: "assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
2. See e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated and re-
manded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), where the circuit court was left with a clear impression that
disqualification motions have substantially grown in number; Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 819 (5th Cir. 1976): "[A]ttempts to disqualify opposing counsel are be-
coming increasingly frequent. .. ."
3. See infra text accompanying notes 103-114.
4. Lerner, Motions to Disqualify Opposing Counsel: Eliminating the Gamesmanship, 191
N.Y.L.J. 5 (Feb. 7, 1984).
5. When the alleged conflict of interest would clearly prejudice the client or make a
travesty of the judicial system, the attorney is correct in moving for disqualification. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 through EC 5-20 (1980).
6. Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Allegaert v. Perot,
565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d
290, 296 (6th Cir. 1978); Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F.
Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. 1980); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
7. See Lerner, supra note 4.
8. Id.
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motions may deny the defendant her right to counsel of choice.9 As
courts face increasing numbers of motions to disqualify, the problems
raised by late motions and the need for a solution become pressing.
This Note proposes an addition to the Model Code which limits the
time within which motions to disqualify defense counsel may be brought.
By encouraging early motions, the detrimental effects of the motions can
be minimized. Under the proposed amendment, truly impermissible con-
flicts of interest would still be heard, but motions brought merely for
tactical reasons would not.10 Because the timing of motions to disqualify
is generally within the control of the moving attorney, she should be sub-
ject to discipline under the Model Code for bringing the motion in a
manner that impairs the constitutional rights of the defendant. The pro-
posed rule should be included in the Model Code in order to clarify the
line between zealous representation and unethical behavior.
I. The Problem
Motions to disqualify defense counsel brought near the trial date
may violate the defendant's constitutional rights,1" and cause the defend-
ant to suffer both psychologically and monetarily. Postponing the trial
date is especially hard on the defendant because it prolongs the social
stigma of public accusation just when that period of stigma is expected to
end. This occurs regardless of whether the motion is ultimately granted.
If the motion is granted, the defendant with a privately retained at-
torney incurs double expense. Since almost all the work done by the
disqualified attorney is nondiscoverable work product, it may be denied
to the newly retained attorney. The new attorney must begin virtually at
square one, and the defendant must compensate the new attorney for the
work for which she has already paid the disqualified attorney.
As a matter of strategy, the prosecution often brings a motion to
disqualify defense counsel in order to damage the defense, or to buy time
for the prosecution. If a disqualification motion is granted, the prosecu-
tion may profit from the opposition's reduced preparation time and re-
sulting dimunition of effectiveness.
Bringing motions to disqualify earlier in the proceedings may tem-
per these drastic effects, and it is for this reason that the timing of mo-
tions to disqualify should reflect on their validity. Because the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility permits untimely motions to disqual-
ify, the proposed rule should be adopted.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 44-102.
10. Because tactical motions are often brought near the date set for trial, they would be
eliminated under the proposed rule. See infra text accompanying notes 116-123.
11. See infra notes 44-102 and accompanying text.
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II. The Model Code as it Exists
The Model Code must be broad and flexible in defining impermissi-
ble conflicts of interest, since these conflicts vary widely from case to
case. As a result, the Model Code is subject to abuse. Overzealous attor-
neys may bring bad faith motions to disqualify late in the proceedings
because the disciplinary rules are necessarily vague. The Model Code
identifies three types of conflicts that may subject an attorney to disquali-
fication:12 simultaneous representation of conflicting interests, present
representation conflicting with the interests of a former client, and per-
sonal interests conflicting with the interests of a present client.
A. Simultaneous Representation of Conflicting Interests
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 governs conflicts resulting from simultane-
ous representation of clients whose interests potentially conflict. 13 Under
this rule a lawyer shall not accept profferred employment if in her profes-
sional judgment it would likely require her to represent differing inter-
ests. 4 In other words, if a prudent attorney's performance would likely
be affected by the multiple representation, the attorney should be dis-
qualified.
In the criminal context, problems most often arise under this rule
when one attorney seeks to represent more than one codefendant in a
joint trial. Simultaneous representation of codefendants can be attacked
even when the clients have intelligently consented 5 after full disclosure
of the potential problems. 6 The rationale for defying the defendant's
intelligent waiver of conflict-free representation is generally explained on
the grounds that the defendant may not know enough to act in her best
interest. In United States v. Shepard, 17 the court commented that a de-
fendant's pretrial waiver may be no more than abstract speculation be-
cause the information available to the defendant at that time is
insufficient, since the future strategy of the government is unpredictable
12. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-105.
13. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, 1.12,
1.13, 2.2 (1983).
14. United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 803 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The waiver must be
voluntary, and must be knowingly and intelligently made to be effective.").
15. See United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1982) (the government moved to
disqualify counsel for two codefendants despite their waiver of the right to have independent
counsel); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978) (the chosen attorney was dis-
qualified from representing either of two codefendants where one pled guilty at trial, despite
their requests to retain the attorney); United States v. Agosto, 538 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Minn.
1982) (the attorney was disqualified despite the waiver by his clients).
16. 675 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1982).
17. Id. at 979; see also United States v. Agosto, 538 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Minn. 1982). This
argument also was used in United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (3d Cir. 1978),
where the judge was unable to advise the defendant of all potential prejudices.
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and potential prejudices are not yet known.1 8
This judicial stance on intelligent waiver enables the government to
bring and probably win a motion to disqualify defense counsel merely by
asserting that its trial strategy is undecided or unpredictable. The appeal
of this argument is that it can be based on a mere showing of the com-
plexity of multiparty prosecutions.' 9 In this way, the defendant may
quickly lose assistance from the only criminal defense firm in the area;20
or, in the case of poor defendants, their only chance of obtaining counsel
other than that appointed by the court. Sharing an attorney is often the
only way impoverished codefendants can afford a privately retained at-
torney, and the government can eliminate this option all too easily.
B. Present Representation Conflicting with the Interests of a Former
Client
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(2) governs current representation that is
potentially contrary to the interests of a former client. The Rule states
that an attorney shall not knowingly "[u]se a confidence or secret of his
client to the disadvantage of the client."' 2 ' The test to determine whether
this conflict exists was first enunciated in T.C. Theater Corp. v. Warner
Brothers Pictures,22 where the court interpreted the rule to prohibit rep-
resentation when it is possible that the attorney obtained confidential in-
formation from the former client.23
Part of the appeal of bringing motions to disqualify opposing coun-
sel under a claim of former adverse representation is that these disqualifi-
cations run to the entire law firm or agency of the disqualified attorney.24
Because the rule of imputed disqualification is based on the assumption
of inter-office sharing of confidential communications, 5 the moving at-
torney need not prove that any communications have been actually
shared, or that the alleged communication is damaging to the prosecu-
18. See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1982), where the government
based its motion in part on the possibility that defense counsel may be forced into taking
inconsistent positions because of the complexity of the case.
19. Margolin & Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense Counsel, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 227, 229 (1982) ("If the government's disqualification challenge succeeds, the
best qualified lawyers (and their firms, which may be the only available firms practicing the
relevant field of law), may be removed from the case.").
20. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101(B)(2).
21. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
22. Id. at 268.
23. See MODEL CODE, supra note I, DR 5-105(D).
24. The doctrine was developed to protect the attorney-client privilege of a former client
of the attorney whose disqualification was sought on the premise that to require the former
client to prove that he made confidential communications to this attorney would result in
destruction of the privilege. This doctrine is linked to the rule originated in T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
25. See, eg., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 13:579
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tion.2 6 Under Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), an entire criminal defense
firm may be disqualified without any demonstration of a substantive con-
ffict.27 These motions are particularly abusive when the disqualified at-
torney is a member of a large, departmentalized, and geographically
diverse firm.28
C. Personal Interests Conflicting with those of the Client
Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A) and (B) govern the potential conflict be-
tween the attorney's personal interests and those of the client she seeks to
represent.2 9 Subdivision (A) of the Rule requires that an attorney or a
member of her firm withdraw from representation when she ought to be
called as a witness on behalf of her own client.30 This Rule is based on
(1) the difficulty involved in arguing one's own credibility, (2) the general
appearance of impropriety in doing so, and (3) the arduousness of im-
peaching a fellow attorney.3' Subdivision (B) provides that a lawyer or a
member of her firm should withdraw whenever she learns or it is obvious
that she or a member of her firm may be called as a witness other than on
behalf of the client.32 Particularly when an attorney may be called to
testify for the opposition, she must withdraw from representation or face
disqualification by the court.
The potential for abuse of subdivision (B) is particularly great. As
at least one court has admonished, "[Disciplinary Rule 5-102(B)] was not
designed to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and
thereby disqualify him .... ",3 While this rule was not intended to be a
tool of trial strategy, many motions to disqualify opposing counsel are
based on the threat of being called to testify.34 Under subdivision (B),
the prosecutor need merely allege that to the best of her knowledge, the
defense counsel will be called to testify.35 Even if she ultimately does not
call opposing counsel to the stand, the assertion that the opposing coun-
26. See supra note 24.
27. See Hodes & Gabinet, The Ethics of Disqualifying Attorneysfor Strategic Reasons, 193
N.Y.L.J. at 1, col. 3 (April 18, 1985).
28. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-102(A), (B). Aside from those discussed, the
Model Code also governs financial or business interests of the attorney, id. DR 5-101, and the
acceptance of outside compensation that may influence the attorney's performance, id. DR 5-
107.
29. Id. DR 5-102(A).
30. See generally, Wydick, Trial Counsel as Witness: The Code and the Model Rules, 15
U.C.D. L. REv. 651 (1982). An additional problem is that the attorney may intentionally
disregard the need for his own testimony in the case in order to retain the client representation.
31. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-102(B).
32. Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 620, 230 P.2d 576, 580 (1951).
33. See, eg., United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1982).
34. However, if the allegation is unfounded the attorney who signed and verified the mo-
tion may be subject to sanction under MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(2).
35. Id. DR 7-102(A)(1).
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sel may be called is adequate grounds for disqualification of both the
defense attorney and her entire firm.
D. The Protection Provided by the Model Code
The Code is relatively silent regarding the timing of disqualification
motions. The direction it provides is couched in terms of ethical axioms,
which is fitting for a document guiding the ethical conduct of attorneys.
However, when the attorneys who move for disqualification-supposedly
to uphold the ethical guidelines-are actually doing so for unethical rea-
sons, something less philosophical and more practical is needed.
The Code's existing regulation, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1), pro-
vides that "a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct
a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when
he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another."36 Given the broad flexibility of the
conflict rules, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1), does little to protect the
defendant. "It is an unimaginative lawyer indeed who cannot think of
some reason to seek disqualification other than for obvious delay or
harassment."37
Aside from Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1), the Code provides only a
weak statement 38 requesting that attorneys "be temperate and dignified"
in their conduct, and that they "refrain from all illegal and morally rep-
rehensible conduct., 39 This Ethical Consideration is not mandatory, but
is merely aspirational. Similarly, the admonition directed specifically to
the government, that the "prosecutor should be punctual... in the sub-
mission of all motions, briefs, and other papers,"' is merely advisory.
There is no professional sanction for failure to follow these standards."a
So long as the rules identifying impermissible conflicts of interest are
indefinite, their potential for abuse in the adversary process remains
strong.4' Because the adversary process is of less than utopian design,
36. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702,
736 (1977).
37. The Preamble explains, "[t]he Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character
and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive."
MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Preamble.
38. Id. EC 1-5.
39. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JuSTIcE, 3-2.9(b)
The Prosecution Function (ABA 1979).
40. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 4-1.1(f)
(ABA 1979). The Defense Function explains that "the standard is intended as a guide to
honorable professional conduct and performance."
41. Because attorneys work within a process based on adversarial ethics, attorneys see it
as their duty to exhaust any and all of the procedural options open to them. This can be easily
justified as zealous representation for which attorneys are praised.
42. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702,
735 (1977).
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and because the conflict rules lend themselves to abuses of the sort de-
scribed, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1) does not adequately protect the
rights of criminal defendants. Yet, it is the only mandatory guidance the
Code provides.4'
IMI. The Effects of Late Motions to Disqualify on the
Constitutional Rights of Defendants
A. The Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
44
Beginning with the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama,45 the Sixth
Amendment has been interpreted to guarantee the effective assistance of
counsel.46 The guarantee of effective representation inures to defendants
43. First Wis. Mortgage & Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-110(A)(2) provides that an attorney withdrawing from
employment shall deliver "to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled."
Similarly, EC 2-32 provides that "even when he justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect
the welfare of his client by ... delivering to the client all papers and property to which the
client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed ...." Id. EC 2-32. Never-
theless, access to the work product of the disqualifed attorney seems dependent upon the rea-
son why the attorney was disqualified in the first place. As the court explained in First Wis.
Mortgage & Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d at 397:
To say that a lawyer's physical presence gives the appearance of impropriety while
the use of his work product does not is to immerse oneself in the same 'hair-splitting
niceties' which properly have been condemned in the enforcement of ethical stan-
dards.... While there might be a point where an attorney's acts are so ministerial or
otherwise unobjectionable to the former client that such work could be used by sub-
stitute counsel after disqualification, we are not compelled to draw that line in the
present case.
See also Realco Services, Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("[I]t is unclear
whether substitute counsel should be permitted [access to the work product of a disqualified
firm] where the original counsel is disqualified under the 'substantial relationship' test."). Con-
tra Academy of Cal. Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 999, 124 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1975) (where the defendant discharged his own attorney then sought to recover the work
product, the court demanded that the attorney turn over the files because to hold otherwise
would result in extreme delay and expense).
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
45. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
46. Id. at 71. This explication was extended to the states through incorporation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). The Court reasoned:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad .... He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
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with privately retained attorneys and court-appointed attorneys alike.47
Although the Court recognizes the constitutional right to effective assist-
ance of counsel, not until Strickland v. Washington,4 in 1984, did it de-
fine the criteria for ascertaining when the right has been violated. Under
Strickland the right to effective assistance is violated if counsel has not
functioned as a reasonably competent attorney,49 and counsel's deficien-
cies were prejudicial to the defendant.50
Deficiencies in attorney performance may be shown by specific acts
or omissions, including failure to fully investigate the facts and law.
When a motion to disqualify is granted near the trial date, the judge may
refuse to grant a continuance. When this occurs, the replacement attor-
47. See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970); see also Garton v.
Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1974).
48. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
Prior to Strickland, courts "traditionally have resisted any realistic inquiry into the com-
petency of trial counsel." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117 (1977) (Brennan, J. dissent-
ing). Prior to 1973, the "farce and mockery test" was applied by eleven of the federal circuits.
Eight others (the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eight, Ninth and the District of Colum-
bia) adopted a reasonableness standard, while others utilized the ABA's test from the 1971
draft of the Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function. ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971). Other circuits (for
example, the Sixth) took the existing tests and varied them to fit their own sense of justice.
Despite the numerous variations by these courts, the effective assistance of counsel was
generally taken to mean such assistance that the rights of the accused are properly safeguarded
and his defense is competently and zealously presented. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The courts customarily focus not only on
the attorney's in-court performance, but on the attorney's familiarity with the facts and the
law of the particular case. See, e.g., Hollingshead v. Wainwright, 423 F.2d 1059, 1060 (5th
Cir. 1970). And they do so in light of the circumstances of the individual case. See e.g.,
Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1356 (5th Cir. 1981); Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
The one striking commonality of the tests is the courts' continuing concern for the time
the attorney has had to prepare the case for trial. See, e.g., United States v. King, 664 F.2d
1171, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1981). Because attorneys have a duty to investigate, they must be
afforded sufficient time to do so:
Counsel has a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the facts and circum-
stances of a given case.... Pretrial preparation is 'susceptible to reasonably objective
determinations'..., and the failure to investigate is one such objective violation of
the attorney's duty to his client .... 'Counsel must conduct appropriate investiga-
tions, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed
Johnson v. United States, 413 A.2d 499, 503 (D.C. 1980) (quoting respectively Oesby v. United
States, 398 A.2d 1, 8 n.14 (D.C. 1979); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 819 (D.C.
1978); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968)). For a full explanation see Com-
ment, The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Counsel: What Does It Mean Today?, 59 NEB.
L. REV. 1040 (1980); see also Baldwin v. Blackburn, 653 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981); Via v.
Powhatan Correctional Center, 643 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. King, 664 F.2d
1171 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Baynes, 622 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1980).
49. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87.
50. Id. at 694.
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ney may not have adequate time to fulfill the duty of investigation. In
some cases, the shortness of time to prepare may itself give rise to a pre-
sumption of ineffectiveness and prejudice.
The prejudice element of the Strickland standard requires the de-
fendant to show that there was a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's errors, the outcome of the case would have been different.5
The defendant whose attorney was disqualified late in the proceedings
without the grant of a continuance, may show prejudice by demonstrat-
ing that the new attorney suffered from a lack of knowledge of the facts
of the case, because she was not allowed sufficient time to conduct in-
dependent investigation. Thus, successful motions to disqualify defense
counsel brought near the trial date may cause both deficiency and preju-
dice which can threaten, if not violate, defendant's constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Because criminal cases often involve several parties or complicated
facts, criminal cases require months or even years of preparation.52 An
attorney retained or appointed near the trial date probably will not have
sufficient time to assess thoroughly the facts and defenses available to the
defendant. As a result, the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel will be impaired. If the newly retained attorney is granted the
time necessary to adequately prepare, the late motion to disqualify may
have created a "Catch 22" situation: upholding either the right to a
speedy trial or the right to effective assistance of counsel, but not both.
Therefore, neither granting nor denying a continuance can preserve the
defendant's rights.
B. The Right to a Speedy Trial
The Sixth Amendment guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."53 In addi-
tion to the constitutional provision, each federal district court must con-
duct continuing studies of the administration of criminal cases and plan
for prompt case disposition under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.11 The
purpose of the right to a speedy trial is to prevent undue and oppressive
incarceration prior to trial, minimize the anxiety and concern accompa-
nying public accusation, and limit the possibility that long delay will im-
pair the ability of an accused to defend herself.55
Even though the purpose of the speedy trial right is broad, its appli-
cation is limited. The right is necessarily relative and sometimes consis-
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 538 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Minn. 1982) (where the
attorney had been working on the case for over three years before the trial date).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-56, 3161-74 (1985).
55. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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tent with delays.5 6 Violations depend on the circumstances of each case.
The right is not violated by delays caused by the accused:57 for example,
if the defendant seeks to have her appointed counsel disqualified, the time
necessary for her new attorney to become familiar with the case cannot
support a claim of a violation of her speedy trial right." Moreover, the
right is not violated when the delay is excusable or unavoidable. For ex-
ample, courts have held that the right to a speedy trial is not violated
when a judge's illness and the resulting court congestion cause a five
month delay;59 when extra time is needed to deal with foreign govern-
ments;60 or when the trial is postponed because of the defendant's
hospitalization. 1
When the delay is not caused by the defendant, courts apply an ad
hoc balancing test to determine the constitutionality of the delay.6' The
court balances the conduct of the defense and the prosecution, paying
particular attention to the length of the delay, the reasons for it, the de-
fendant's assertion or nonassertion of her constitutional rights, and any
prejudice resulting from the delay.63 The prejudice factor is not limited
to impairment of the defendant's case; the defendant's mental suffering is
also considered." Institutional delays, such as court recesses, are consid-
ered in the balancing, but delays caused by tactical moves weigh most
heavily in determining violations of the right.65 In addition, delays re-
56. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1966).
57. Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947).
58. See United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975), where the court used this
reasoning to deny the defendant's claim when a significant portion of the thirteen month delay
between arrest and trial was due to several motions and counsel changes by the defendant
himself, and where the defendant failed to show substantial prejudice from the delay.
59. United States v. Latimer, 548 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1977).
60. United States v. Hay, 527 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1975).
61. United States v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1978).
62. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
63. Id. at 530-33.
64. United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Greene, 578 F.2d 648, 655 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Prejudice may take the form of specific harm to
the presentment of a defense or simply personal prejudice, such as the loss of employment and
family and the experiencing of public scorn and obloquy occasioned by having to stand ac-
cused for a significant period of time."); United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir.
1976) ("That a defendant should be accorded a fair and prompt chance to exculpate himself, as
well as to be relieved of the anxiety and societal pressures of a public accusation of criminal
conduct, lies at the root of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial."); United States
v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1973) ("As to the anxiety and stigma which inevitably
attach to arrest and indictment, we must recognize that they exist despite the fact that a trial
transcript or court record will seldom reveal them. Nor can this form of prejudice be treated
lightly.., they are the 'major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee.' "). But see
United States v. Hill, 622 F.2d 900, 910 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that reliance on the anxiety
inherent in the delay, standing alone, is an insufficient form of prejudice to warrant reversal).
65. Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), affid, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (government's
decision to prosecute in a district where venue was doubtful and ultimately denied, while venue
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suiting from deliberate choices made by the prosecution for its own ad-
vantage may violate the defendant's right regardless of whether the
government's choice was made in good faith.
66
Even when made in good faith, disqualification motions inevitably
cause delay. Delays resulting from untimely motions can range from a
few months to nearly a year.67 A motion to disqualify made near the
trial date may harm the defendant in a variety of ways. If a court grants
a continuance to hear the motion, and thereby postpones the trial date,
the defendant's right to a speedy trial may be denied. Even if the motion
is ultimately denied, preparation for the hearing will have cost the de-
fendant valuable time. In addition, a late motion may cause the defend-
ant extreme anxiety under the pressure of prolonged social opprobrium.
The defendant's anguish is exacerbated if she must be incarcerated longer
because of the time necessary to investigate and hear the motion.68 If the
motion to disqualify is granted, the defendant must suffer additional de-
lay while the new attorney investigates the facts and prepares the case for
trial. Moreover, the defendant's case may be prejudiced or impaired.
The new attorney may never attain the same level of understanding of
the case as the disqualified attorney because during the time taken to
hear the disqualification motion, witnesses may have died or moved
away, memories may have faded, and evidence may have staled or
disappeared.69
When these results spring from a motion to disqualify brought by
the government for merely tactical reasons, the delays are neither excusa-
ble nor unavoidable. Because the defendant has not caused the delay, the
court will apply the balancing test and will likely determine that the de-
fendant has been denied a constitutional right.70 Thus, when a tactical
motion to disqualify is brought near the trial date, the inherent delays
in another district was clearly appropriate); United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal.
1959) (government chose to prosecute by court-martial even though jurisdiction was doubtful).
66. See United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1976).
67. See Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 680 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982) (court noted the nine
month delay before dismissing the motion as unfounded); United States v. Agosto, 538 F.
Supp. 1149 (D. Minn. 1982) (trial was postponed for a full five months before the defendant's
attorney of three years was disqualified).
68. See, e.g., Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 385 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The present case is a
paradigm example of the personal prejudice the right to a speedy trial is designed to prevent.
Cain, a resident of Chicago, Illinois, was incarcerated in Louisville, Kentucky. His incarcera-
tion, quite obviously, disrupted his family life, isolated him from his friends, and destroyed his
ability to continue to work as a dental technician .... The harsh and often times violent
atmosphere of jail undoubtedly inflicted a grave hardship on him.").
69. United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 802 (6th Cir. 1983) ("From the time of dis-
qualification the defendant's case is affected by the loss of an attorney in whom he has confi-
dence. Even a most competent counsel who enters the picture following disqualification of the
attorney first selected by the defendant labors under severe handicaps.").
70. When the delay is through no fault of the defendant and is brought for tactical reasons
causing long delay, all of the considerations point toward denial of the right.
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will almost inevitably result in the denial of the defendant's right to a
speedy trial.
C. The Right to Counsel of Choice
Although the right of the criminally accused to be represented by
the counsel of her choice is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, the
right has been held to be "an essential component of the Sixth Amend-
ment."71 As the Court explained in Powell v. Alabama,7 2 "[i]t is hardly
necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant
should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own
choice."73 In addition to being implicitly found in the Sixth Amend-
ment, the right to counsel of choice is also grounded in the Due Process
Clause.74 Nevertheless, the right to counsel of choice has clear limits.
The right of the indigent defendant to have the court appoint a par-
ticular attorney is restricted to very specific situations. In California, the
right to choice of appointed counsel is confined to situations where the
preferred attorney has previously represented the defendant in a related
prosecution, or where other counsel would have to spend substantial time
and effort to attain the necessary factual and legal background.7" In ad-
dition, the defendant's prior relationship with the preferred attorney
must have given rise to a sense of mutual trust and confidence between
them.76 The court will appoint the attorney of the defendant's choice if it
is convinced that appointment of that attorney will afford the defendant a
continuity of representation, lessen public expense, and will not offend
countervailing considerations of comparable weight."
Under the federal standards, the right to have counsel appointed
does not guarantee the defendant a "meaningful relationship" with the
appointed attorney,78 nor does it imply a right to have a particular attor-
71. See Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969).
72. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
73. Id. at 53.
74. See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnston,
318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1963); Harris v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 786, 567 P.2d 750, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1978).
75. Harris, 19 Cal. 3d at 795-98, 567 P.2d at 756-58, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 324-26.
76. Id. at 797, 567 P.2d at 757, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
77. Id. at 799, 567 P.2d at 759, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
78. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1983). But see, id. at 22-24 (Brennan, J.,
concurring):
Nothing about indigent defendants makes their relationships with their attorneys less
important, or less deserving of protection, than those of wealthy defendants.... It
follows that once counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant, whether it
be the public defender or a volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into an attor-
ney-client relationship which is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained.
To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to an unwarranted and invid-
ious discrimination arising merely from the poverty of the accused.
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ney appointed.79 Nevertheless, when an indigent defendant objects to the
appointed attorney the court will inquire into the defendant's complaint
in a manner that is sufficient to ease her dissatisfaction, distrust, and
concern. 
0
Only upon a showing of good cause may the indigent defendant re-
quest the replacement of an appointed attorney."1 Good cause is not de-
termined solely according to the subjective standards of the defendant.8 2
A defendant's general loss of confidence or trust in her appointed coun-
sel, standing alone, is insufficient, 3 as is a bare conclusion that the ap-
pointed attorney cannot adequately represent the defendant.8 4
Although the Supreme Court has never specifically set forth what
constitutes good cause, it is important that to avoid delay, the defendant
raise specific complaints at the time of arraignment8 5 and suggest a par-
ticular attorney with whom she feels comfortable.86 The court must also
consider the appointed attorney's opinion regarding her ability to ade-
quately represent the defendant.
8 7
The defendant's right to retain private counsel of her choice is more
readily upheld, but it too is limited. The right must yield to overriding
interests of justice, which include preserving the integrity of the court's
procedures,88 avoiding the likelihood of public suspicion, 9 and uphold-
ing regulations promoting the interests of the state.9" In exercising the
right to choose her attorney, the defendant may not select an attorney in
a fashion that will obstruct judicial administration or frustrate the func-
tion of the judiciary.91 For example, the defendant cannot manipulate
the selection process to disrupt the trial or intentionally cause delay.92
While the restrictions on the defendant's right to counsel of choice
79. Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir. 1985).
80. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970).
81. United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1966).
82. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1981).
83. Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1430-31 (4th Cir. 1983).
84. Conroy v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
85. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 595 (1lth Cir. 1984); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d
826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982).
86. United States v. Parhms, 424 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir. 1970).
87. Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1433 (4th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the Morris
Court as influenced by counsel's statement to the trial court that he was ready for trial). Con-
tra Sykes v. Virginia, 364 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966) (irrelevant that appointed counsel stated
that he was unprepared).
88. United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1985).
89. United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828-29 (11th Cir. 1982).
90. Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (lst Cir. 1976); United States ex rel Carey v.
Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1969).
91. See, eg., United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1977); People v. Felder, 22
Ill. App. 3d 737, 317 N.E.2d 595 (1979); People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 392 P.2d 964, 58
Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964); People v. Shaw, 46 Cal. App. 2d 768, 117 P.2d 34 (1941).
92. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981).
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are strictly applied, the right may not be limited unnecessarily.9 3 The
prosecution must show that some important interest will be adversely
affected before it can deny the defendant's counsel of choice.94 Neither
unreasonable docket control95 nor the government's interests in having
uninterrupted criminal proceedings96 is sufficient to deny the defendant's
choice of counsel.
Decisions upholding the defendant's right to counsel of choice
against disqualification motions are based on the realization that counsel
disqualification has a serious and immediate effect.97 "[W]ere a defendant
not provided the opportunity to select his own counsel at his own ex-
pense, substantial risk would arise that the basic trust between counsel
and client, which is the cornerstone of the adversary system, would be
undercut."98 When chosen counsel is disqualifed near the date set for
trial, the defendant loses an attorney whom she has grown to trust. Since
disqualifications sometimes run to the disqualified attorney's entire law
firm, the defendant may be precluded from retaining a member of the
only firm in the area that is qualified to try the case.
The indigent defendant will likely be unable to convince the court to
appoint another attorney with whom she has had a relationship in the
past. A defendant's choice of replacement counsel may also be vicari-
ously disqualified if the attorney had jointly represented the defendant, in
a prior matter, with the disqualified attorney. Moreover, the defendant's
choice of replacement counsel may be overruled if some past aspect of
their attorney-client relationship poses a potential conflict of interest. If
the defendant has never been represented by an attorney, or has been
represented only by an attorney who has also been disqualified, the de-
fendant has no grounds to request that the court appoint a specific attor-
ney, and she must take whomever the court appoints. When the court
appoints a new attorney without granting a continuance, the defendant
will be represented by an attorney with whom she has not had the time to
establish a relationship of trust and confidence.
When the privately retained attorney of choice is disqualifed late in
the proceedings, the defendant may be rushed into hiring another attor-
ney without much time for evaluation of her credentials or experience.
The court may deny the defendant's request for a continuance to find
new counsel if the continuance will interrupt the orderly administration
of justice. 99 Because the court may find that the motion to disqualify for
93. United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978).
94. United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983).
95. See supra note 88.
96. See supra note 90.
97. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724 (E.D.
N.Y. 1979).
98. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981).
99. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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conflict of interest should have been foreseen, only a slight inconvenience
or delay may be a sufficient ground for rejecting a request for continu-
ance to obtain new counsel. 1O
When the disqualification is granted without a continuance, the de-
fendant may not be given adequate time to secure her second choice; this
result may constitute a denial of due process. 11 In the end, the defend-
ant may be represented by an attorney whom she does not completely
know and trust and whom she has retained without adequate delibera-
tion. For example, in United States v. Agosto,'0 2 when the defendant's
attorney of three years was disqualified, the defendant was represented at
trial by an attorney he had known for only two months. Whether or not
the new attorney was highly competent, one could hardly say the two
month relationship was of the quality of the first. Thus the untimely
motion to disqualify may defeat the right to counsel of choice and under-
mine the basic trust and confidence between attorney and client.
IV. Judicial Altering of the Model Code
Recognizing the potential for improving defendants' rights against
tactical motions to disqualify, courts have viewed the motions as adver-
sarial strategic ploys, 103 and have approached them with a jaundiced
eye. 104 To assure the genuineness of motions to disqualify, some courts
have gone beyond cynicism and have imposed stringent standards on the
motions. In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 105
the court refused to accept the Model Code's irrebuttable presumption of
disclosure of confidential communications between members of the same
law firm."' 6 In a concurring opinion in J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 
107
Judge Gurfein demanded that "strict judicial scrutiny" be applied when-
ever disqualification of an attorney is sought because the opposition has
called her as a witness.'08 Judge Gurfein justified this change as prevent-
ing the "literalism [of the Rule] 09 from possibly overcoming substantial
justice to the parties."' 10 In MacArthur v. Bank of New York,"' the
court required a showing that the attorney's testimony on behalf of his
100. Id. at 492.
101. United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1963).
102. 538 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Minn. 1982).
103. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J.,
concurring).
104. Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
105. 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977).
106. See also, First Wis. Mortgage and Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.
1978).
107. 523 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975).
108. Id. at 1360 (Gurfein, J., concurring).
109. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-102(B).
110. 523 F.2d at 1360.
111. 524 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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own client is "genuinely necessary" 1 2 when the adversary seeks disquali-
fication on this ground.
113
The courts' ad hoe changes do not preserve the rights of the defend-
ant whose counsel is being challenged. While the stricter standards may
result in fewer unnecessary disqualifications, the motions still harm the
defendant. The trial may be postponed to hear the motion, perhaps caus-
ing the defendant to spend additional time in jail. As a result, her mental
anguish may continue. If the trial is not postponed, the defendant with a
privately retained attorney must pay her attorney for the time spent op-
posing the motion. Further, if the court refuses to impose stricter stan-
dards on the motion, the defendant's view of the criminal justice system
will be tainted.' 14 Indeed, ad hoe standards result in an unequal applica-
tion of the law, which harms the integrity of the justice system. Ad hoe
judicial changes at the trial level are inefficient and unfair.
V. Proposed Rule
To curtail the abuses of the conflict rules and to preserve the rights
of the criminal defendant, a rule bearing directly on when motions to
disqualify may be brought should be added to the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility."' The rule should contain the following
provisions:
Any attorney seeking to disqualify her opponent under the Discipli-
nary Rules preventing conflicts of interest must bring the motion as soon
as she knows or should have known the alleged conflict exists, but under
no circumstances later than a prescribed number of days before the date
set for trial." 6 Should an attorney seek to disqualify her opponent after
the proscribed number of days before the trial date, she must make a
112. Id. at 1210.
113. Id.
114. For thorough explanation, see generally J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE DEFENDANT's PERSPECTIVE (1972).
115. While an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) may seem a plausible
remedy, prosecutors are absolutely immune from such an action. See, e.g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), holding that a prosecuting attorney acting within the scope of
his prosecution in presenting the State's case, is absolutely immune from a civil suit for dam-
ages under section 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional rights; see also
Kennedy, Prosecutorial Immunity Under Section 1983, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 361 (1983);
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2
(1983).
116. This Note does not determine exactly what the time limit should be. That is more
properly determined by the legislature and the American Bar Association. However, in decid-
ing what the time limit should be, particular attention should be paid to the purpose of the
conflict rules. As the states incorporate the new rule into their existing standards, the time
limit should be based on the time allowed for discovery in that state. In this way, internal
consistency can be achieved.
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prima facie showing of the alleged conflict before the motion will be
heard. In addition, the attorney must show by clear evidence that:
(a) sufficient steps were taken at the outset of discovery to ascertain
the alleged conflict and the appropriate steps taken were not fruitful; and
(b) there is no less disruptive means by which the alleged conflict
can be resolved.
Moreover, the attorney seeking disqualification shall bear the bur-
den of showing that there is no less disruptive means by which the al-
leged conflict of interest-may be resolved.
1 17
An exception to the rule would allow attorneys to argue for disquali-
fication after expiration of the time limit, but it is restricted to the most
extreme circumstances. To come within the exception the moving attor-
ney must demonstrate that she could not reasonably have discovered the
conflict earlier, and if the failure to discover the conflict was by any fault
of the moving attorney, the motion will be denied. However, if an actual
conflict exists, the prima facie showing will be easily made. This narrow
exception therefore limits late disqualification motions to those situations
where the harm resulting to the defendant is justified. Violations of the
rule would be grounds for disciplining attorneys who seek to manipulate
the judicial rules to their own advantage, at the expense of the defend-
ant's rights.
VI. Effects of the Proposed Rule
The major distinction between the proposed rule, and the Model
Code as it exists, is the specific time limit imposed for motions brought to
disqualify counsel. Although having a specific time limitation in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility may seem somewhat unusual,
a vague "reasonable time" standard will not adequately protect the inter-
ests of criminal defendants.11 8 As the cases reveal, too many attorneys
consider any time-even the eve of trial-to be a reasonable time to
move for disqualification. A reasonable time limit encourages late mo-
tions because the motions will be heard no matter when they are
brought. 9 In contrast, a specific time limit in the Model Code would
put attorneys on notice that motions brought late in the proceedings for
tactical reasons are unacceptable. Such a rule would provide an incen-
117. See United States v. Agosto, 538 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (D. Minn. 1982).
118. Binding moving attorneys to a reasonable time would not add anything to the existing
disciplinary rule in the Model Code. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981). A
devious attorney could still justify an eve-of-trial motion based on factors within her control.
Flimsy explanations of what was reasonable under the circumstances would still unfairly im-
pinge on the constitutional rights of the defendant by warranting undue delay and possible
postponement of the trial date.
119. See supra notes 1, 4 and text accompanying notes 36-43.
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tive to investigate and bring motions to disqualify as soon as conflicts are
recognized.
Time limitations are not completely unknown to the rules governing
professional responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(F) sets a strict thirty
day time period during which the attorney is bound by any fee advertise-
ment she has placed. 120 Rule 2-101(E) of the California Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct requires an attorney to keep within her possession any
written or electronic communication from her clients for one year. 121 In
addition, the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that an
attorney must retain any advertisement for a full two years after publica-
tion. 1 22 Thus, setting specific time periods in the Model Code may be
appropriate when necessary to serve the ends of justice.
Because late motions to disqualify often impair the constitutional
rights of defendants, and because the Model Code purports to guide the
ethical conduct of attorneys, the suggested time limit would be an appro-
priate addition to the Model Code. Attorneys bringing late motions in
bad faith should be subject to sanctions by the state or local bar associa-
tion. The rule proposed would provide a clear, bright line standard in
determining when an attorney has acted in an unethical fashion. Setting
a specific time period for disqualification motions would protect the
rights of the particular defendant and uphold the integrity of the Bar.
A. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
For a motion to disqualify to comply with the time requirements of
the proposed rule, it must be brought as soon as the alleged conflict of
interest is discovered. When the motion is brought early in the proceed-
ings, the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel can be pre-
served even if the motion is granted without a continuance; the new
attorney will have the benefit of time to become fully conversant in the
facts and law of the case. She will have nearly the same amount of time
to prepare for trial as the moving attorney. Rather than rushing into the
case under the pressure of a rapidly approaching trial date, she may pur-
sue all the investigative avenues open to her. The defendant will thus be
represented at trial by a well prepared attorney, whose performance will
likely be reasonably competent, and will probably not result in any
prejudice.
B. The Right to a Speedy Trial
Although some delay will inevitably result from any motion to dis-
qualify, not all delays violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Even
when a motion is brought within the time limits of the proposed rule,
120. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-101(F) (1984).
121. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2-101(E) (1984).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7-2(b) (1984).
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delay would result.123 However, the delay, and the resultant harm,
would be minimized. Motions brought within the limits of the proposed
rule, even if granted, will cause far less delay because the new attorney
will not have to spend time duplicating the preparation of the disqualified
attorney in its totality. When the motion is brought early in the proceed-
ings, the disqualified attorney will probably not have spent a great deal of
time on preparation. The new attorney's work may be more effective
because the witness' memories and the evidence will be fresh. Moreover,
the defendant's anxiety will be lessened because the trial would not be
prolonged by the collateral issue of disqualification. Because the new at-
torney can prepare the case more efficiently, the trial date may remain
the same. Thus, the time the defendant is incarcerated and subject to the
stigma of public accusation may not be extended at all beyond the origi-
nal trial date.
C. The Right to Counsel of Choice
If motions to disqualify are brought as soon as the alleged conflict is
discovered, the non-indigent defendant will have more time to search for
alternative counsel in whom she has, or can develop, trust and confi-
dence. Because the motion will have been heard early in the proceedings,
a continuance for the purpose of finding another attorney is less likely to
interrupt judicial administration, and thus it is more likely to be granted.
Because the choice will not be made under the time pressure of an im-
pending trial date, the defendant may choose calmly and intelligently.
Once chosen, the defendant will have sufficient time to become ac-
quainted with the new attorney to learn to trust and confide in her.
Thus, early motions to disqualify may permit the defendant to retain an
attorney of choice rather than an attorney of necessity. The benefits of
the proposed rule are less significant for indigent defendants. However,
if the defendant has a second choice counsel who is familiar with the
facts of the case and with whom the defendant has previously had a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence, a disqualification earlier in the proceed-
ings may prompt the court to appoint the defendant's second choice
counsel because the countervailing factor of delay would probably be
insignificant.
Conclusion
This Note has addressed the problem of motions to disqualify de-
fense counsel brought near the date set for trial. Motions brought late in
the proceedings often are brought for tactical reasons rather than for
123. Delay will still result from the time necessary to investigate the alleged conflict of
interest, and to hear and decide the merits of the motion.
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concern for the parties' rights.12 4 These motions cause delay, expense,
and anguish for the defendant. Conversely, they buy time for the prose-
cution and can eliminate the most qualified opposition. When the gov-
ernment successfully disqualifies defense counsel near the trial date, the
defendant's constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel, to
a speedy trial, and to counsel of choice may be impaired. When these
results stem from motions brought for purely tactical reasons, the mov-
ing attorney should be subject to sanctions for disregarding the rights of
the defendant and behaving in an unethical fashion.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not adequately
provide for such sanctions, nor does it sufficiently protect the rights of
defendants from untimely motions to disqualify.
The rule proposed in this Note is a practical way to alleviate the
infringement of constitutional rights caused by late motions to disqualify.
The rule encourages prompt investigation of potential conflicts of interest
and requires that motions be brought as soon as a conflict is realized.
Motions brought earlier in the proceedings preserve the rights of the de-
fendant while still allowing substantial conflicts of interest to be chal-
lenged. Adding the proposed rule to the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility can protect the rights of the criminal defendant and up-
hold the integrity of the legal profession.
By Judith Tury*
124. See Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1352 (D. Colo. 1976).
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